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Agamben’s Homo Sacer turns centrally upon “bare life”. However, the fol-
lowing subjects are not thematized: natality, gender, sexuality, the relation of 
the sexes, the heterosexual character of the symbolic order and political cul-
ture, the interest of women in the reproduction of life. The entire question of 
sexual difference —like that of the difference between victim and perpetrator, 
between witnesses and those born afterwards— is banned from Agamben’s 
horizon. Thus a deep unease remains, which this paper is intended to explore. 
,WZLOO¿UVWSUHVHQWWKHPHWKRGRORJLFDODQGWKHRUHWLFDOLQVSLUDWLRQVWKDWHomo 
Sacer owes to the thought of Carl Schmitt. Secondly it will show that Schmitt’s 
concepts of nomos and the state of exception cannot provide a suitable basis 
for rewriting Foucault’s concept of biopolitics.
KEYWORDS: Homo Sacer, bare life, sexual difference, Carl Schmitt, bio-
politics. 
Homo Sacer de Agamben se centra en la “nuda vida”. Sin embargo, no temati-
za la natalidad, el género, la sexualidad, la relación entre los sexos, el carácter 
heterosexual del orden simbólico y la cultura política, el interés de la mujer 
en la reproducción de la vida. La cuestión de la diferencia sexual —como la 
diferencia entre víctima y perpetrador, entre testigos y los nacidos posterior-
mente— es excluida desde el horizonte de Agamben. A partir de una profunda 
incomodidad que despierta Homo Sacer, este artículo se propone explorar las 
inspiraciones metodológicas y teóricas que este libro de Agamben debe al pen-
samiento de Carl Schmitt. Después, mostrará que los conceptos de Schmitt 
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de nomos y estado de excepción no pueden proveer una base adecuada para 
reescribir el concepto foucaultiano de la biopolítica. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Homo Sacer, nuda vida, diferencia sexual, Carl Schmitt, 
biopolítica.
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Once again there appears to be a need for philosophy in the strong sense 
of the word. This, at least, is suggested by the international acclaim of 
the theses of Giorgio Agamben. In his three-volume Homo Sacer, the 
¿UVWYROXPHRIZKLFKZDVSXEOLVKHG LQ WKH ,WDOLDQSKLORVRSKHU
presents a new attempt at a critique of violence as a fundamental cri-
tique of Western thought (cf. Agamben 1995). The book subtitled Sov-
ereign Power and Bare Life KDGLWV¿UVWH[WUDRUGLQDU\LPSDFWKRZHYHU
when it appeared in English translation in Stanford University Press’s 
lauded series Meridian:Crossing Aesthetics (cf. Agamben 1995).
The legitimacy of Agamben’s allusion to the scandalous conditions 
XQGHUZKLFKKXPDQEHLQJV DUH WRGD\ LQWHUQHG LQ FDPSV FRQ¿QHGRU
GHSRUWHGZLWKRXWOHJDOULJKWVLVFRQ¿UPHGE\WKHFRQGLWLRQVLQ*XDQ-
tánamo Bay (cf. Assheuer) as well as by the political movement of the 
sans papiers. In an ever-increasing number of locations in the world, 
“legal grey zones” are created in which human beings are treated as su-
SHUÀXRXVERGLHV'HVSLWHDOOWKHHYLGHQFHIRU$JDPEHQ¶VWKHVLVDGHHS
unease remains. I would like to explore this unease in what follows. 
A discussion of the foundations of Homo Sacer seems appro priate not 
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only because of the book’s uncommon impact but also because Agam-
ben’s philosophy of biopolitics takes on some highly topical and impor-
tant questions. The demand for a certain precision becomes all the more 
pressing precisely because of the topicality of the themes treated. Thus, 
for example, Agamben takes it upon himself not only to further Fou-
cault’s concept of biopolitics but also to correct it in crucial places. Yet 
does Agamben’s existential philosophy actually represent a correction 
of Foucault? Doesn’t it lead, rather than to a differentiation, to a de-his-
toricization and trivialization of the concept of biopolitics? I would like 
to return to these questions at the end of my paper. I will begin by inves-
tigating the reasons for my aforementioned unease, which will lead us 
to consider Agamben’s reception of the German lawyer Carl Schmitt’s 
contentious theses of legal theory. The presentation of the methodologi-
cal and theoretical inspirations which Homo Sacer owes to the thought 
RI&DUO6FKPLWWZLOOOHDGXV¿QDOO\WRWKHTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHUWKHFRQ-
cepts of nomos and the state of exception, which belong to political or-
dering, are actually suitable to rewrite Foucault’s concept of biopolitics.
Thought in the State of Exception
7KH¿UVWUHDVRQIRUP\XQHDVHOLHVLQ$JDPEHQ¶VFRQFHSWLRQRISKLORVR-
phy as thought in the state of exception.
Agamben is fascinated by a form of philosophical thought which has 
the power to determine questions of existence, a fascination he transmits 
to his readers. As an avowed pupil of Martin Heidegger and Hannah Ar-
endt (cf. Leitgeb and Vismann: 16-21), he combines the fundamental 
ontology and analysis of totalitarianism in which Hannah Arendt inter-
prets the concentration camps as “the laboratories in the experiment of 
total domination” (Agamben 1998: 120) with Carl Schmitt’s decision-
ism. From this position, he formulates the need for a re-reading and 
correction of the Foucauldian concepts of sovereignty and biopower. 
Following Carl Schmitt, he holds the opinion that the truth is revealed 
solely in the extreme, in the state of exception.
He elaborates what he wishes to be understood within a philosophy 
of the state of exception in the third part of Homo Sacer, Remnants of 
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Auschwitz. Here he elaborates the most extreme limit of thought from 
DQ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH ¿JXUH RI WKH ³PXVHOPDQQ´ 7KRVH SULVRQHUV
in the Nazi death camps who moved on the border between life and 
death, wholly disempowered, were named “muselmänner.” Agamben 
starts with the concept of the “muselmann”, frees it from its historical 
situation, transforms it into a metaphor, makes it the cornerstone of his 
FRQFHSWRISKLORVRSK\DQG¿QDOO\EXLOGVKLVSKLORVRSK\XSRQLW7KH
“muselmann”, he writes, is “the perfect cipher of the camp” (Agamben 
1999: 48). The “muselmann” represents, he explains further, “the non-
place in which all disciplinary barriers are destroyed and all embank-
PHQWVÀRRGHG´:LWK WKLV$JDPEHQPDUNVQRWRQO\ WKHERXQGDU\RI
that which can be said, but marks at the same time, in the ethical and 
epistemological sense, a border crossing claim which he pursues with 
his understanding of philosophy. Following upon the above analysis of 
WKH³PXVHOPDQQ´KHGH¿QHVKLVFRQFHSWRISKLORVRSK\³,QWKLVVHQVH
SKLORVRSK\FDQEHGH¿QHGDVWKHZRUOGVHHQIURPDQH[WUHPHVLWXDWLRQ
that has become the rule (according to some philosophers, the name of 
this extreme situation is ‘God’)” (Agamben 1999: 50). Agambenian phi-
losophy thus promises a worldview from the perspective of the extreme 
situation, which, as he adds, some philosophers designate as “God”. 
One can understand this as philosophy in the strong sense of the word.
From the perspective of critical philosophy, it appears, of course, 
doubtful whether an examination of the world from a divine perspec-
tive would contribute anything essential to a better understanding of 
the world. These doubts are aimed at the philosophical foundations on 
which a critique of violence might be sustained. The theoretical invoca-
WLRQRIWKHH[WUHPHVLWXDWLRQHQFRXUDJHVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQZLWKDYLROHQFH
LQYRNHGLQWKH¿UVWSODFHLQWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHVWDWHRIH[FHSWLRQ
Agamben succumbs to this temptation when he declares that the “musel-
mann” is the “perfect cipher” for the state of exception and then philo-
sophically seizes upon this most extreme border situation in order to 
regard the world from its perspective. Philosophy in this sense dissolves 
differences instead of doing them justice. It becomes violent in itself.
Agamben claims for himself the position of a philosophical outsider. 
He is, in fact, one of few philosophers not to approach questions con-
cerning the border between life and death posed by the rapid develop-
54 DEUBER-MANKOWSKY  /  Cutting off Mediation. Agamben as Master Thinker
ment of the life sciences from the perspective of analytic ethics. Instead 
of analyzing meanings, he develops broad philosophical foundations 
which have put pressure on decisions about death and OLIHRQQHZGH¿-
nitions of the beginnings of life, the different types of being dead, and 
what constitutes a life worth living. What matters for Agamben is the 
investigation of a culture that, according WRKLV WKHVLV¿QGV LWV LQQHU
cohesion through the creation of zones of indifference between life and 
GHDWK+H¿QGVWKHVH]RQHVRQWKHRQHKDQGLQPHGLFLQHZKLFKDUWL¿-
cially prolongs life, and on the other hand in a politics that robs people 
RIWKHLUIXQGDPHQWDOKXPDQULJKWVLQRUGHUWRFRQ¿QHWKHPin camps, 
and there to reduce them to their bodies, their bare existence. According 
to Agamben, the democratic judicial order proves itself a facade for a 
logic that reveals its violence in the establishment of interstitial zones 
outside the law, in which people are compelled to represent “bare life”. 
He calls this culture modernity and locates its paradigm or matrix in the 
“camp” (Agamben 1998: 166).
 
His thesis culminates in the claim that 
the camp forms the nomos of modernity.
The Legacy of Carl Schmitt
Homo Sacer would have been inconceivable without Carl Schmitt’s 
theory of sovereignty. It is Agamben’s point of departure, and he invari-
ably returns to it. Schmitt not only represents the godfather of a philo-
sophical procedure oriented around the state of exception, but, with his 
theory of sovereignty, supplies Agamben with the theoretical founda-
tion for his history of the West.
Now the concepts, so selectively and obviously derived from Carl 
Schmitt, are polemical FRQFHSWVDV-DFRE7DXEHVWKHLQÀXHQWLDOVFKRO-
DURIUHOLJLRXVVWXGLHVKDVDSWO\HPSKDVL]HG7KHVHDUH¿JKWLQJZRUGV
They draw their obviousness from the fact that they constitute them-
selves as oppositional concepts; that is: the concepts of Carl Schmitt 
derive their power of persuasion from the fact that they are aimed at 
a visible, although also sometimes invisible, enemy. This is precisely 
what creates their polarizing character and their apparent clarity. They 
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release one from doubt and insecurity; they reduce all complexity and 
ambiguity. 
Similarly, in Homo Sacer, Agamben creates the appearance of clarity 
by adopting Schmitt’s overly-simplifying procedure and appropriating 
Schmitt’s simplistic concepts as his own foundational ones. In this ap-
propriation, however, Agamben ignores the fact that Schmitt developed 
his theory of sovereignty as an opposing standpoint to the “rule of law”, 
and ignores the fact that Schmitt equates the “rule of law” with legal posi-
tivism and the latter with “Jewish liberalism”. This approach is closely 
connected with the anti-Semitism constitutive of Schmitt’s thought (cf. 
Gross).
 
Agamben does not problematize this anti-Semitism, fundamen-
tal to Schmitt’s theory of the nomos as well as his friend/enemy schema. 
Instead, he extends the currency of the concept of the nomos by ontolo-
gizing it.
I would like to expand upon WKHVH FULWLFDO UHÀHFWLRQV FRQFHUQLQJ
Agamben’s ties to Schmitt in the course of a description of Agamben’s 
theses. This will lead us to the question of whether Agamben’s re-con-
nection of biopolitics and sovereign authority in fact represents a cor-
rection to Foucault’s confusion of biopolitics and sovereign authority. 
I cannot, here, go into the meanings which Hannah Arendt’s analyses 
of totalitarianism put forward, nor can I treat Agamben’s relation to 
Walter Benjamin, from whose essay, “Critique of Violence”, Agamben 
borrows the concept of “bare”1
 
life. I would like, however, to point to 
Samuel Weber’s critical examination in his essay “Gestus und Gewalt 
Agamben über Benjamin über Kafka über Cervantes – Kettenlektüre” 
[“Gesture and Violence: Agamben on Benjamin on Kafka on Cervantes 
– Chain-reading”]. Samuel Weber delivered the text as a lecture on Feb-
ruary 20, 2004 at the University of Basel.
The Nomos and German Law
Agamben’s philosophical treatment of the political begins with the 
existence of an “original political relation” (Agamben 1998: 181). This 
1  I have translated both “das bloße Leben” and “nacktes Leben” as “bare life through-
out, in accordance with the English translation of Homo Sacer [CED].
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IRUPV WKH IRXQGDWLRQ RI WKH WZHQW\¿YHKXQGUHG\HDU KLVWRU\ RI WKH
West described by the author. Agamben equates this original political 
relation with the “ban”, understanding by “ban” the state of exception 
as a zone of indistinction between inside and outside, between inclu-
sion and exclusion (181). The ban is an act, and presupposes an actor 
who delivers the ban: this actor is the sovereign who with the decisive 
act —that is, the ban— posits law, and with this positing of law abolis-
hes the indistinction of outside and inside. With the ban, the sovereign 
creates an outside and an inside, and thereby constitutes the sphere of 
the political. Now, with the construction of the political, as Agamben 
remarks and upon which he founds his theory of violence, the sphere 
of indistinction is not only abolished but created in the same stroke, in 
so far as the sovereign constitutes the legal order. The positing of law is 
accompanied by the production of a sphere that lies outside the space of 
the law. Agamben terms this sphere “bare life”. As the zone of indistinc-
tion banned to the outside of the inside, bare life marks the “threshold of 
articulation between nature and culture” (181).
 
Agamben equates this 
articulation with the articulation of zoe, in the sense of (natural) bare 
life, and bios as a cultural or political form of life.
Agamben explicitly distances himself from all theories that found 
sovereignty upon an antecedent contract. He relies exclusively upon Carl 
Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty. Contractual theories lack, according to 
Agamben, the very metaphysical core inherent in the positing of the law.
Agamben thereby universalizes —nolens volens— that exclusive 
concept of law which Schmitt devised as the essence of German law in 
the thirties, and which he extended to all of Europe’s peoples in 1950 
as the “nomos of the earth”: the nomos. The nomos, too, is originally a 
polemical concept. Schmitt devised it in opposition to the concept of 
the “law”. The “law” embodies for Schmitt the epitome of the norm and 
thus of the “should”. For Schmitt, the norm was the expression of the 
very legal positivism he was attacking, and was consigned to the vocab-
ulary of the “enemy”. In Schmitt’s cosmos, “Jewish liberalism” repre-
sented the incarnation of the enemy and was linked to the concept of the 
law. He accused liberalism of conceiving of the law as “universal”, “ab-
stract”, and hence detached from the “concrete” ground, people, state, 
and life. In his book, Carl Schmitt und die Juden [Carl Schmitt and the 
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Jews], Raphael Gross traces in detail the history of the origin of the 
concept of the nomos. The concept of nomos as the expression of “Ger-
man law” was, for Schmitt in the thirties, the synonym for the related-
ness of the German ground, people, and leader. The law, denounced 
as “abstract”, “Jewish”, DQG ³JURXQGOHVV´ GLG QRW ¿W LQWR 6FKPLWW¶V
theory of sovereignty, oriented around the state of exception and the 
decision, and was therefore passionately opposed by him. The associa-
tion of law and justice is linked to the claim of universality. Schmitt 
could only see in this the origin of a disorder threatening the authority 
and unity of the State. The law was, for him, the beginning of anarchy.
Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty puts the category of ordering [Ord-
nung] in place of the question of justice.
Now, Agamben constructs his theory of the ban as the “original polit-
ical relation” precisely upon the dual meanings of ordering [Ordnung] 
and localization [Ortung] elaborated by Schmitt in The Nomos of the 
Earth. He adopts without commentary the imbrication of the legal and 
spatial ordering established by Schmitt —and without a word employs 
WKHDOLHQDWLQJDQGKLJKO\VWUDQJHEXWH[WUHPHO\VLJQL¿FDQW sexual met-
aphor in Schmitt’s remarks on the “taking of land”—. As in all of Homo 
Sacer, which turns centrally upon “bare life”, neither natality nor gen-
der [Geschlechtlichkeit], neither sexuality nor the relation of the sexes, 
neither the heterosexual character of the symbolic order and political 
culture nor the interest of women in the reproduction of life, is thema-
tized. The entire sphere of the question of sexual difference —like that 
of a possible relation between law and justice— is  banned from Agam-
ben’s horizon.
Agamben thus assumes, without commentary, the program of an un-
derstanding of law which has as its origin a “Volk or people’s theol-
ogy of the nomos”. Furthermore, Agamben not only advances Schmitt’s 
conception of nomos as the original taking of land [Landnahme] as the 
“primeval division and distribution” [Ur-Teilung and Ur-Verteilung] 
(Schmitt: 67) but also declares it to be the archetypal form of the posit-
ing of law and of the constitution of the political in general.2 He then 
2  Cf. Agamben 1995: 19. “What is at issue in the sovereign exception is not so 
much the controlRUQHXWUDOL]DWLRQRIDQH[FHVVDVWKHFUHDWLRQDQGGH¿QLWLRQ of the 
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supplements Schmitt’s interpretation of the nomos as the sovereign 
“taking of land” [Landnahme] with the thesis that the sovereign nomos 
is not only the takingRIODQGEXWLV¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWD³WDNLQJRI the 
outside” and thus an exception [Ausnahme] (Agamben 1998: 19). With 
this he goes further than Schmitt, who at least recognizes the thought of 
a law without space as the stance of the enemy.$JDPEHQLGHQWL¿HVODZ
with justice and justice with the nomos, and thereby robs himself of all 
possibility of thinking justice in an alternative form than the nomos, for 
instance as universal law.3
History of Decline
$JDPEHQIROORZV&DUO6FKPLWW LQKLVGH¿QLWLRQRI WKHVRYHUHLJQDFW
as already indicated, however, he adds to the combination of appro-
priation, distribution, and production —wherein Schmitt saw the func-
tion of the nomos as mediating between the state, the judiciary and 
the economy— the creation of a state of exception, which would take 
place simultaneously to the establishment of the legal order. This allows 
Agamben to shift Schmitt’s focus from the State to the camp. For the 
exception materializes in spaces that stand outside the law, as he points 
out in his interpretation of the ban as the original act of the sovereign. 
On the other hand, these spaces assume different forms in the course of 
Western history. They change in parallel to the relation in which “bare 
life” stands to the sovereign or the exceptional case stands to the rule.
Now, according to Agamben, it is decisive for modernity
that, together with the process by which the exception everywhere be-
comes the rule, the realm of bare life —which is originally situated at 
very space in which the juridico-political order can have validity. In this sense, the 
sovereign exception is the fundamental localization (Ortung), which does not limit 
itself to distinguishing what is outside and inside, the normal situation and chaos, enter 
into those complex topological relations that make the validity of the juridical order 
possible”.
3  Cf. For different ways of conceiving of the law, see Bär and Deuber-Mankowsky, 
“Wie viel Glaube ist im Staat? Ein transdisziplinärer Austausch zwischen Kultur- und 
Rechtswissenschaft”: 89-111.
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the margins of the political order— gradually begins to coincide with the 
political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios 
and zoe, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction (9).
The conclusion is that sovereignty —whose original function of de-
cision consists in the discrimination between “bare life” and the politi-
cal, zoe and bios, or more simply, nature and culture— switches from 
the State to the camp. Agamben interprets the camp as the territorializa-
tion of the exception. This explains the claim that the camp is the nomos 
of modernity. It is, of course, assumed that one shares Agamben’s diag-
nosis according to which the exception increasingly becomes the rule; 
only then is one in a position to grasp the whole scope of Agamben’s 
apocalyptic vision. Behind the evocation of a “biopolitical catastrophe” 
hides the same anxiety which drove Schmitt to defend the state of order 
—the fear of the intermingling of nature and culture, death and life, the 
fear of anarchy and chaos.
The elevation of the camp to the matrix of modernity rests upon 
the thin basis of Carl Schmitt’s interpretation of justice as nomos and the 
claimed nexus of justice, order and territory.
The additional interpretation of the sovereign act as the original po-
litical relation of the ban, opens up a narrow range of combinatory pos-
sibilities out of which Agamben delineates the history of the West. This 
history follows the logic of violence inscribed in the ban and is corre-
spondingly a history of decline.4
4  7KH¿UVWSRVVLELOLW\FRQVLVWVLQ the success of the state of indifference which ac-
companies the exception through the differentiation of inside and outside and private 
and public (in Hannah Arendt’s sense). This is the case in the Greek polis, in which, 
according to Agamben, a differentiation was made between the domain of the oikos as 
the domain of zoe, appearing here as “bare life”, and that of the polis as the domain of 
political life. “In the classical world, however, simple natural life is excluded from 
the polis in the strict sense, and remains FRQ¿QHG²DVPHUHO\UHSURGXFWLYHOLIH²WRWKH
sphere of the oikos” (Agamben 1995: 2). Agamben refers to Aristotle’s differentiation 
of the “oikonomos (the head of an estate) and the despotes (the head of the family), 
both of whom are concerned with the reproduction and the subsistence of life (2) from 
the politicians, who are concerned with the political. The contribution of women to the 
preservation of life is not taken into account, and the question of a possible overlap of 
gender differences with the differentiation of nature and culture is ignored.
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In modernity, the “taking-of-land” in the “exception” [Ausnahme], 
quite literally, is materialized in the establishment of camps. With this, 
Agamben also claims, the exception becomes the rule. The modern is 
characterized by the unmediated elevation of political space above that 
of bare life. I quote from Homo Sacer: 
One of the theses of the present inquiry is that in our age, the state of 
exception comes more and more to the foreground as the fundamental 
political structure and ultimately begins to become the rule. When our 
age tried to grant the un-localizable a permanent and visible localiza-
tion, the result was the concentration camp. The camp —and not the 
prison— is the space that corresponds to this originary structure of the 
nomos (20). 
In this perpetual state of exception, we are all, according to Agam-
ben, virtual “homines sacri” (115), all potential Jewesses and Jews, 
whom the author designates as “the representatives par excellence and 
almost the living symbol of the people and of the bare life that moderni-
ty necessarily creates within itself, but whose presence it can no longer 
tolerate in any way” (179). 
The second possibility is that the differentiation is not wholly successful and that 
a zone comes into being in which this indistinguishability is materialized. This is the 
case in the constitution of the so-called “homo sacer”. Homo sacer is the abbreviated 
formulation for a much-discussed and variously interpreted sentence from archaic Ro-
man law. In the law of Twelve Tables (8, 21), he who as patron deceives his clients is 
declared to be sacer, outlawed, without peace.
Agamben bases his interpretation of homo sacer on Pompeius Festus’ lexicon, ac-
cording to which homo sacer is a man who is condemned for a crime and killed but may 
QRWEHVDFUL¿FHG7KHhomo sacer is, in a sense, free game. Agamben equates him with 
the condemned and interprets him as the representative, the embodiment, of “bare life”, 
of the bare life released in the sovereign act of constituting the law. This historical phase 
begins with archaic Roman law and lasts until institution of the Habeas Corpus Act 
in 1679. This act allowed anyone under arrest to bring his case before the court within 
three days. The goal was to limit arbitrary arrests. Literally, it means that everyone who 
holds someone under arrest is required personally to bring the arrested party before the 
court within three days. For Agamben, with this legal formulation, which is focused on 
physical presence, the body becomes a political subject. The role of representing bare 
life is transferred to this body, and with this, according to Agamben, begins the last 
phase of Western history.
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Once again, this passage clearly shows how the thinking of the state 
of exception functions and where it leads. The orientation around the 
extreme promises the highest concreteness but leads to empty abstrac-
tion, as the sweeping generalization that we are all potentially homines 
sacri makes clear. As such, it is not only an affront to the concrete suf-
ferings of the victims and their relatives. It does not only level out the 
differences between victims and perpetrators, between witnesses and 
those born afterwards. It also effaces existing and —through the imple-
mentation of globalization— increasing class differences between rich 
and poor, north and south, between those ZKR IXO¿OO DQG WKRVHZKR
deviate from the norm.
It is as if Agamben were playing into Foucault’s hands, for Foucault 
criticises the concentration on the theory of sovereignty precisely on the 
grounds that through an ideology RID¿FWLYHXQLW\RISRZHULWUHQGHUV 
invisible actual relations of domination and difference, as well as the 
perpetual struggles for power.
Both the category of the state of exception as well as the concentra-
tion on the camp as the “taking of land of the exception” refer back to 
the origin of Agamben’s theory in Carl Schmitt’s doctrine of sover-
eignty and his concept of the nomos. Finally, he is Schmittian in his 
interpretation of the collapse of inner and outer as the irruption of a 
catastrophe, a catastrophe Schmitt compares to the coming of the An-
tichrist. Thus, according to Agamben, the catastrophe of modernity is 
the consequence of the dissolution of the distinction between political 
existence (bios) and bare life (zoe), in so far as bare life, rather than 
being differentiated from the political, becomes the foundation of the 
political in the camp.
While, for Schmitt, the distinction between friend and enemy repre-
sents a necessary category for the construction of the political, Agam-
ben replaces these categories —in explicit analogy to Schmitt— with 
the distinction between “bare life” and “political existence” (8). Of 
course, Agamben aims to expose the violence characteristic of, and es-
sential to, the Western politico-juridical model of power from its begin-
nings. He traps himself, however, in a circle of violence, culminating 
in the story of decline presented here, by ontologizing and thereby de-
historicizing it.
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The Critique of Michel Foucault
By focussing on Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty, Agamben claims to 
re-introduce questions of legal theory into the discussion of biopoli-
tics. Precisely this legal theoretical aspect is supposedly neglected by 
Foucault in his concentration on a dynamical model of power. Does, 
however, Agamben’s reconnection of biopolitics to sovereign authority 
in fact represent a correction to Foucault’s limitation of sovereignty and 
biopower? I would like to close by pursuing this question.
$JDPEHQ¿UVW UHSURDFKHV)RXFDXOW IRUKDYLQJIDLOHG WR¿QGD link 
between his investigations of the “techniques of the self” and the politi-
cal strategies of biopower (5f). Then he reproaches him for neglecting 
to provide an analysis of modern totalitarianism and the concentration 
camp (119). Agamben seeks to address both points with his reformula-
tion of biopolitics.
+RZHYHU KH UHGXFHV WKH FRPSOH[ DQG IDUUHDFKLQJ ¿UVW TXHVWLRQ
of how the intermingling of the techniques of the self may be thought 
along with the processes of the totalization of power, to the sole aspect 
controlling his own epistemological interest: how the biopolitical mod-
el of power interferes with the juridico-institutional model of power. 
Thus power is no longer thought of as a complex relation of forces, 
as in Foucault, but appears as the formation of two blocks. This has as 
DFRQVHTXHQFH¿UVW WKDWWKHZKROHFRPSOH[RIVWUXJJOHVDQGZLWKLW
the question of oppositional movements, remains unthought. Second, 
Agamben omits precisely the interest in epistemology which had guid-
ed Foucault in his research on the techniques of the self: the question 
of how, in view of the disciplining and subjugation of the subject, to 
explain the development of an art of critique.
His answer to the question of how the biopolitical model of power 
interferes with the juridico-institutional one is simple: there is no dif-
ference between sovereign authority and biopower, for the biopoliti-
cal body is nothing other than the production and therefore the original 
activity of sovereign power itself. Thus he arrives at the statement that 
biopolitics has always been an integral aspect of sovereign authority 
and therefore just as ancient as the sovereign state of exception itself. 
The modern state consequently represents nothing new, but in making 
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biological life the center of its calculations, it merely brings to light 
the secret tie that always already binds power to bare life (6). Thus, 
the modern state is tied to the immemorial of the “arcana imperii” ac-
cording to Agamben’s law of a “tenacious correspondence between 
the modern and the archaic, which one encounters in the most diverse 
spheres” (6).
In fact, Agamben’s reformulation of the concepts of sovereign au-
thority and biopolitics results not only in a monolithic, static model of 
power but also in a similar move that blocks any view of the historically 
HI¿FDFLRXVIRUFHVRIUHVLVWDQFH%\ERZLQJGRZQEHIRUHWKHVRYHUHLJQ
authority to which he attributes, as the “supreme power”, the “capacity 
to constitute oneself and others as life that may be killed but not sacri-
¿FHG´$JDPEHQUHLQVWDOOVWKHRPLQRXVO\UHPDLQLQJVRYHUHLJQDV
the solitary actor and motor of history.
Unlike Agamben, Foucault conceives of power as a relation of forces 
and thinks of it from the bottom up. For Foucault, it is a matter of en-
couraging the sort of knowledge he calls buried or subjugated (2003a: 
8). Accordingly, he grants the highest importance to the requirement 
not to read into history what one already knew beforehand. The bur-
ied historical knowledge he sought to unearth concerned the historical 
knowledge of struggles, precisely the knowledge a monolithic model of 
power relegates to the darkness of forgetting. It obstructs a view of the 
actual and possible historical forms of resistance.
Starting with the Enlightenment conceived of as a relation of forces, 
Foucault develops in his late work the possibility of an ethics in the form 
of an “aesthetic of existence”. He links this with the answer he gave in 
a 1977 lecture to the self-posed question “what is critique?” Critique is, 
as he formulated it in 1977, an attitude and, as such, a virtue; according 
to the now famous general characterization, critique is: “the art of not 
being governed” (2003a: 265). Foucault locates the “core” of this art of 
critique, which he equates with the art of self-legislation, in three places:
First, the Bible: emerging out of the question of how to interpret the 
Holy Text, and whether in general the Bible corresponds to the truth.
Second, the juridical: arising from the impulse to no longer accept 
existing laws because one senses that they are unjust.
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Third, the epistemological: the development of the sciences led to 
the renunciation of obedience to an authority that determined what was 
true and what was untrue.
From this tripartite origin of critique, Foucault describes the “core 
of critique” as the “the bundle of relationships that are tied to one an-
other, or one to the two others, power, truth and the subject”. Critique 
therefore questions the “truth on its effects of power and questions 
power on its discourses RIWUXWK´DQGQRZDOORZVLWVHOIWREHVSHFL¿HG
as ³WKHDUWRIYROXQWDU\LQVXERUGLQDWLRQWKDWRIUHÀHFWHGLQWUDFWDELOLW\´
(266). It is no accident that Foucault approaches the question of resis-
tance via the language of law. The art of “self-legislation” is another 
word for autonomy —giving law to oneself—. Now, for Foucault, the 
investigation of the techniques of the self is connected to the question 
of the conditions that would give the most space to the art of critique. 
Techniques of the self are therefore not only techniques of subjuga-
tion but mean every form of creating a relation of the self to itself. 
Also belonging to this is the form that Foucault, in one of his last lec-
tures from 1983-1984, calls the parrhesiastic relationship of the sub-
ject with himself (Foucault 2001: 13). Parrhesia may be translated as 
“speaking freely” but also as “speaking truly”. It designates a relation 
of the subject that speaks with itself. And it does this in such a way that 
the subject binds itself both to the enunciation and to the enunciating 
itself. In this “parrhesiastic enunciation”, Foucault discovers a tech-
nique of the self which can be regarded as the condition of possibility 
of critique. Through the double relation contained in the parrhesiastic 
utterance, the subject enters into a binding relation with himself and, as 
such, practices the art of critique:
In parrhesia the speaker emphasizes the fact that he is both the subject of 
the enunciation and the subject of the enunciandum – that he himself is the 
VXEMHFWRIWKHRSLQLRQWRZKLFKKHUHIHUV7KHVSHFL¿FµVSHHFKDFWLYLW\¶
of the parrhesiastic enunciation thus takes the form: ‘I am the one who 
thinks this and that’ ... the commitment involved in parrhesia is linked 
...to the fact that the parrhesiastes says something which is dangerous to 
himself and thus involves a risk (13).
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Through this double relationship, the subject enters into a binding 
relation to that which he has enunciated as truth. This relation enables 
him to be released from the authority of the accepted form of justice 
and to contradict an authority felt to be untrue and thus unjust. The 
parrhesiastic utterance, which Foucault explicitly distinguishes from 
the performative utterance, is taken as a point of departure for the art 
of self-legislation. The risks indicated, which the subject takes upon 
himself, extend to the penalty of death. In the passage cited, Foucault 
introduces as an example, the subject who “rises up against the tyrant 
and speaks the truth under the eyes of the whole courtly state”.  Han-
nah Arendt poses the question underlying Foucault’s investigations 
concerning the techniques of the self, though in another terminology, 
in her essay Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship (cf. Arendt). 
In this essay, Arendt refers to the question of the (absent) resistance to 
National Socialism. Arendt objects that one should not question why so 
many cooperated but rather why some did not cooperate, thereby incur-
ring the risk of all sorts of consequences.
The discovery and determination of these traces of an “art of not be-
ing governed” presupposes a form of thought which neither understands 
history as mono-causal nor power as monolithic. It is a form of thought 
that understands itself rather as an historical, philosophical praxis and 
as such “a practice of the self ”, and in this sense as a “technique of the 
self” (Foucault 1985: 13).
State Racism
How, then, does Foucault describe the relation of biopower and sov-
ereign authority, and which consequences does he draw for a possible 
explanation of National Socialism? In contrast to Agamben, Foucault 
understands biopower decisively as an historical phenomenon. Its 
emergence is tied to the development of the modern sciences. If one di-
vorces the concept of biopolitics or biopower from the development of 
statistics, modern medicine, biology, evolutionary theory, and the inter-
penetration of the apparatuses of knowledge with the institutions of the 
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state, it then becomes an empty concept. As opposed to Agamben, who 
seeks to ground politics philosophically, Foucault conceives of politics 
as the relationship between power, truth, and the subject. Thus he does 
not understand truth as a transhistorical phenomenon but as the effect 
of concrete historical techniques linked to the history of the sciences. 
Unlike Agamben, Foucault does not reason from philosophy but from 
epistemology. From this perspective, one of Agamben’s central claims 
appears to be pure speculation. That is the claim that the modern state 
is nothing new, but the fact that it places biopolitical life at the center 
of its calculations only reveals the secret bind which has always already 
linked power and “bare life”.
For “life itself ”, just as much as biopower, does not exist before the 
politics of the population. Biopolitics is based on the “societal body” 
developed in the 19th century, which is itself an effect of the apparatus 
of knowledge that developed alongside the modern sciences. Thus, as 
early as The Order of Things, which appeared in 1966, Foucault em-
phasizes that the concept of life in itself, or bare life, is the product of a 
science which has only existed for the past 150 years:
Historians want to write histories of biology in the eighteenth century; 
but they do not realize that biology did not exist then (...). And that, if 
biology was unknown, there was a very simple reason for it: that life 
itself did not exist. All that existed was living beings, which were viewed 
through a grid of knowledge constituted by natural history (Foucault 
1973: 129f).
In his analysis of totalitarianism presented at the close of his lectures 
at the Collège de France in 1975/6,5 Foucault starts from the question of 
how it is possible that a political authority can exercise the function 
of death if it is true that disciplinary and regulatory bio-power always 
seeks more power for itself. In other words, how is it to be explained 
that under the dominance of a biopower whose function consists in the 
optimization of life, not only millions of people but whole peoples were 
murdered?
5  This concerns the lecture delivered on March 17, 1976 (Foucault 2003b: 239-264).
Acta Poetica 36y1, 2015, pp. 49-69 67
The link between sovereign authority and biopower is, as Foucault 
convincingly shows, not the sovereign but state racism. “In a normal-
izing society, race or racism is the precondition that makes killing ac-
ceptable” (Foucault 2003b: 256).
Out of this results WKHDQDO\VLVRIWRWDOLWDULDQLVP¿UVWWKDWLWLVRQO\
explicable under the condition that biopower and the power of sov-
ereignty are understood as distinctive forms of power. That, second, 
biopower is conceived of as a recent historical form of power linked 
to WKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHPRGHUQVFLHQWL¿FDSSDUDWXV7KDWWKLUGWKLV
power has as its aim the optimization of life, where life is related in 
this context to the “social body” or race. And that, fourth, the power of 
sovereignty did not abdicate, but rather, in theFRXUVHRIWKHVHPRGL¿FD-
tions, changed itself by bringing forth state racism in order to continue 
to exercise its function. Thus, totalitarianism can only be understood 
with recourse to racism.
Summarizing, Foucault describes the National Socialist State as fol-
lows:
The Nazi State makes WKH¿HOGRIWKHOLIHLWPDQDJHVSURWHFWVJXDUDQ-
tees, and cultivates in biological terms absolutely coextensive with the 
sovereign right to kill anyone, meaning not only other people, but also 
its own people. There was, in Nazism, a coincidence between a general-
ized biopower and a dictatorship that was at once absolute and retrans-
mitted throughout the entire social body by this fantastic extension of 
the right to kill and of exposure to death. We have an absolutely racist 
State, an absolutely murderous State, and an absolutely suicidal State. 
A racist State, a murderous State, and a suicidal State. The three were 
necessarily superimposed, and theUHVXOWZDVRIFRXUVHERWKWKH³¿QDO
solution” (or the attempt to eliminate, by eliminating the Jews, all the 
other races of which the Jews were both the symbol and the manifesta-
tion) of the years 1942-1943, and then Telegram 71, in which, in April 
1945, Hitler gave the order to destroy the German people’s own living 
conditions (260).
The self-obligation to differentiate belongs to the task of a critique 
of violence; for the task of the critique of violence, as Benjamin estab-
lishes LQWKH¿UVWVHQWHQFHRIKLVHVVD\FDQRQO\EHGH¿QHGDV³WKDWRI
expounding its relation to law and justice”, since a “cause, however 
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effective”, only becomes violent “only when it enters into moral rela-
tions” (Benjamin: 236). Agamben’s elevation of the camp to the matrix 
of modernity, his globalizing explanation of the state of exception to the 
rule, removes itself from history. In this very abstraction, an abstraction 
that carries with it a further abstraction from “ethical relations”, he car-
ries out the violence which he purports to criticize. 
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